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I. INTRODUCTION
Comprised of twenty-five ethnic Italian organized crime
families, La Cosa Nostra (LCN) is the principal organized crime
group in the United States.1 Although primarily engaged in drug
trafficking and gambling operations, LCN is also involved in
business racketeering, prostitution rings, and black market trade.
2
Through its investigations of LCN, Congress determined that the
organization has exerted a tremendous criminal influence on the
nation's economy and infrastructure. 3
Over the past two decades, however, a number of significant
prosecutions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) have undermined LCN's power in the
United States.4 During the 1980s and 1990s, law enforcement
"substantially weakened" or even "virtually eliminated" LCN in
most major U.S. cities, including New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, and New
Orleans.
5
1. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE Div., ORGANIZED CRIME/DRUG BRANCH, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, AN INTRODUCrION TO ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE U.S.
(1993) (reprinted in ORGANIZED CRIME 15 (James D. Torr et. al. eds., 1999)). LCN
means "This Thing of Ours." Id. LCN is often used interchangeably with the term
"Mafia" to describe Italian-American organized crime groups. Lesley Suzanne Bonney,
Comment, The Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban Street Gangs: A Proper Application of
RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 579, 583 (1993). For purposes of this Comment, the term
"LCN" is used in reference to the Italian-American Mafia. In contrast, the term "Mafia"
refers to all Italian organized crime groups in Italy.
2. Bonney, supra note 1, at 586-87.
3. Id. at 580.
4. Alexandra Marks, The Untouchables No More: Mafia Loses Influence in US,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 23, 1997, at 11.
5. Id (quoting Robert Blakey, co-author of RICO).
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Officials credit RICO with law enforcement's remarkable
progress in combatting organized crime.6 Between 1981 and 1988,
the U.S. government convicted dozens of LCN bosses,
underbosses, and "crew chiefs" under RICO.7 Additionally,
prosecutors have used RICO to indict LCN members and
associates at least 2,500 times between 1983 and 1986.8
Law enforcement efforts in Italy, however, have not had the
same powerful effect on organized crime.9  For example,
notwithstanding the 1993 arrest of the "boss of all bosses,"
Salvatore "Toto" Riina, and other influential Mafia members, the
Italian Mafia remains a sophisticated organized crime network. 10
After Riina's arrest, the Italian police believed that Riina had not
"lost his power in the organization as a boss" and that "the top
staff" remained in place.11 Riina's fugitive lieutenants simply took
command of operations after Riina's arrest.12
In 1982, after Mafia members murdered several public
figures, the Italian government enacted Italian Penal Code Article
416-bis 13 as a new weapon for prosecuting organized crime.14
Article 416-bis outlaws membership in, or collaboration with, a
Mafia-type association.15 Additionally, under 416-bis, prosecutors
can indict an individual for association with a Mafia-type
organization, even without a direct link between the individual and
a criminal act.
16
The Italian government implemented Article 416-bis during
the early 1980s,17 around the same time that U.S. prosecutors
6. Stephen J. Hedges, The Great Mafia Roundup. Chicago and Boston are the Latest
Hits in the War on the Mob, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 16, 1990, at 26.
7. JAMES B. JACOBS ET AL., BUSTING THE MOB: UNITED STATES V. COSA NOSTRA
4-5 (1994). The number of RICO prosecutions peaked during the 1980s. Id at 18.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. See Alan Cowell, Italians Voting Today, With Mafia's Role a Top Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 416-bis (Italy). "Bis" is the Italian abbreviation for
amendment.
14. RENt SEINDAL, MAFIA: MONEY AND POLITICS IN SICILY 1950-1997 20 (W. Glyn
Jones trans., 1998).
15. Id.
16. Id
17. Id
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recognized RICO's strength in combatting organized crime.
1 8
Despite shared similarities between the laws,19 however, several
factors have prevented the Italian law from becoming as effective
as its U.S. counterpart. Although Italian officials have curtailed
some Mafia activities, they initially applied Article 416-bis
indiscriminately20 due to difficulties in determining what it meant
to "belong" to a Mafia-type organization. Moreover, the Mafia's
widespread influence over the Italian social and political
infrastructure has proven to be a considerable obstacle to
implementing and enforcing effective laws against organized
crime.
Part II of this Comment describes RICO and its use against
LCN, briefly describes the history of LCN in the United States,
and traces the legislative response to organized crime. Part II also
examines U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of key RICO terms.
Part III describes the evolution of the Italian Mafia and the
development of criminal statutes used to combat organized crime
activities. Part III also examines the difficulties Italian lawmakers
have faced in making progress against organized crime, including
problems with the initial application of 416-bis and the Mafia's
strong influence over the Italian legal and political systems.
This Comment concludes with the following observations: (1)
RICO empowered the U.S. government to prosecute LCN's
leadership effectively; (2) although the Italian government has
made some progress against Mafia activities, the condemning
language of Article 416-bis was too vague when enacted, leading to
its indiscriminate application; and (3) the Mafia's influence over
the Italian legal and political systems hinders effective law
enforcement against organized crime. These factors have limited
the effectiveness of Article 416-bis and prevented it from living up
to the success of its U.S. counterpart.
18. Bonney, supra note 1, at 593. Most LCN prosecutions under RICO did not occur
until the 1980s. Id
19. MARCO JACQUEMET, CREDIBILITY IN COURT: COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES IN
THE CAMORRA TRIALS 46-47 (1996).
20. See infra Part III.E.
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II. LCN AND LAWS DIRECTED AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME
A. LCN in the United States
La Cosa Nostra is an association of career criminals,
organized in a complex, hierarchical structure through which
members profit from illegal enterprises. 21 In exchange for the
benefits of belonging to LCN, members are obligated to remain
absolutely obedient and loyal to the organization.
22
LCN developed in the United States during the early
twentieth century.23 At that time, the number of Mafiosi in the
United States rapidly increased as many sought to avoid
Mussolini's crackdown on the Mafia in Italy.24 It was not until the
1920s, however, that LCN's power significantly expanded as a
result of the lucrative criminal opportunities that arose during
Prohibition. 25 By the end of WWII, LCN's influence extended
into virtually all areas of legitimate and illegitimate U.S.
business.
26
B. Pre-RICO Investigations of La Cosa Nostra
In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. government recognized the
strength of organized crime and established several investigative
commissions. 27  The findings and recommendations of these
entities eventually became key elements behind RICO's
enactment.
28
The first investigative effort began in 1951, when the U.S.
Senate established the Kefauver Committee to examine how
organized crime was structured, which laws LCN violated, and
how these violations affected interstate commerce. 29 While the
findings and recommendations of the Kefauver Committee did not
21. Bonney, supra note 1, at 583-84.
22. Id. at 584.
23. Joseph E. Ritch, Comment, They'll Make You an Offer You Can't Refuse: A
Comparative Analysis of International Organized Crime, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 569,
594 (2002).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 594-95.
26. Id. at 596. LCN also infiltrated labor unions, which increased both their political
influence and control over legitimate businesses. Id. at 596-97.
27. Bonney, supra note 1, at 588.
28. Id
29. Id. at 588-89.
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lead to significant changes in law, they did initiate a greater public
awareness of LCN, particularly through the Committee's widely-
watched televised hearings.
30
Government investigations of organized crime continued
throughout the 1960s. 31 In 1963, Congress formed the McClellan
Committee to continue the Kefauver Committee's efforts.32 The
McClellan Committee gained valuable information about LCN,
which Congress later used in enacting legislation designed to fight
organized crime.33  Building on prior investigations, the
Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime compiled a well-
documented report in 1967. 34 In its report, the Task Force
included recommendations for legislative initiatives against
organized crime.
35
Although legislators introduced several bills soon after the
Task Force presented its recommendations, Congress did not pass
any related legislation until 1969, when it introduced RICO as part
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.36 The Judiciary
Committee Report accompanying the bill proposing RICO
indicated that the government wanted RICO to become the
primary weapon "in mounting a 'frontal attack' against organized
crime," superceding all previous attempts to address the
problem.
37
C. Pre-RICO Legislation
Before RICO's inception, the Hobbs Act, enacted in 1946,
was the most widely-used legislation against organized crime.
38
The Hobbs Act made interference with or obstruction of interstate
commerce a federal crime.39 Anyone who advanced criminal
30. Brian Goodwin, Civil Versus Criminal RICO and the "Eradication" of La Cosa
Nostra, 28 NEw ENG. J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279, 290 (2002); see also David
R. Wade, The Conclusion that a Sinister Conspiracy of Foreign Origin Controls Organized
Crime: The Influence of Nativism in the Kefauver Committee Investigation, 16 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 371,399-403 (1996).
31. Bonney, supra note 1, at 590.
32. Ia& at 589.
33. Id. at 589-90.
34. Id. at 590.
35. Id
36. it.; see also Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970).
37. Bonney, supra note 1, at 590-91.
38. Goodwin, supra note 30, at 289-90.
39. PATRICK J. RYAN, ORGANIZED CRIME: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 80 (1995).
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activities using interstate facilities would be subject to indictment
under the Hobbs Act.
40
Prior to RICO, the legislation the U.S. government used to
fight organized crime had limited effectiveness. 41 Early legislative
and law enforcement efforts aimed at curtailing LCN's activities
applied only against those who actually committed crimes, not the
bosses who commanded their performance. 42 These laws were
only useful against weak, lower-level members, who would
invariably be replaced by more effective Mafiosi.
43
Prior to RICO's passage, an individual could not be held
culpable for the crimes of another; only individuals directly
involved in committing a specific crime could be charged.44 In a
1988 report, the General Accounting Office described the
limitations of pre-RICO legislation and explained how RICO
expanded law enforcement's ability to attack organized crime:
Before [RICO], the government's efforts were necessarily
piece-meal, attacking isolated segments of the organization as
they engaged in single criminal acts. The leaders, when caught,
were only penalized for what seemed to be unimportant crimes.
The larger meaning of these crimes was lost because the big
picture could not be presented in a single criminal prosecution.
With the passage of RICO, the entire picture of the
organization's criminal behavior and the involvement of its
leaders in directing that behavior could be captured and
presented. 45
Thus, RICO unlocked the restrictive legal handcuffs that had
previously limited the scope of prosecutors' abilities under earlier
laws, such as the Hobbs Act.
46
Although technically still on the books, the Hobbs Act has
been overshadowed by RICO.47 In fact, the Hobbs Act did not
40. Id. at 81.
41. Goodwin, supra note 30, at 292.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. RYAN, supra note 39, at 85.
45. G. Robert Blakey & John Robert Blakey, Civil and Criminal RICO: An Overview
of the Statute and its Operation, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 36, 42 (1997) (citing GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTACK ON LA COSA
NOSTRA (1988)).
46. RYAN, supra note 39, at 85.
47. Id. at 81. Compared to the Hobbs Act, RICO provides "relatively harsh
penalties that reach 20 years and ... provides for forfeiture of personal assets acquired
from the proceeds of criminal activity." Id.
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reach its potential as a means to fight organized crime until
prosecutors used it as a predicate act under RICO.48 Ultimately,
the U.S. government's great success in pursuing LCN is due to
RICO's expansive approach.
D. RICO's Purpose and Legislative Intent
In passing RICO, Congress recognized that prosecutors
would be more effective against organized crime if they could
focus on LCN's organizational foundations, rather than on
individual perpetrators.49 Since LCN's organizational structure
and strength, as a whole, is greater than that of its individual
members, prosecutors could only succeed against organized crime
by attacking LCN as an enterprise. 50 Further, by distinguishing
between organized crime and ordinary crime, prosecutors could
impose harsher penalties against organized criminal groups.
51
The U.S. Supreme Court in Russello v. United States
acknowledged the congressional intent aimed towards making
RICO a powerful new law for combating organized crime. 52 In
reviewing RICO's legislative history, the Court found that
Congress intended RICO to provide "new weapons of
unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its
economic roots. "53
Congress wanted to use RICO against sophisticated organized
crime groups that used profits from illegal activities to infiltrate
businesses. 54 The implementation of RICO expanded the scope of
LCN prosecutions by permitting the government to focus on the
entire history of an organization's illegal acts.55 Prosecutors could
present, within a single trial, evidence of multiple acts committed
by numerous LCN members. 5
6
48. Goodwin, supra note 30, at 290.
49. Id at 292.
50. Id
51. Id
52. 464 U.S. 16,26-27 (1983).
53. Russello, 464 U.S. at 26.
54. See Bonney, supra note 1, at 591.
55. See id. at 594.
56. See id
149
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E. RICO's Application
Described as "the most important substantive and procedural
tool in the history of organized-crime control, ' 57 RICO is one
component of a larger statute, the Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA).58 Located in Title IX of OCCA, RICO connects several
laws directed against organized crime to create a single
comprehensive statute.59 The substantive provision most often
used in LCN prosecutions is 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 60 The broadly
constructed language of subsection (c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
61
Few RICO prosecutions occurred in the early 1970s, largely
because prosecutors did not fully comprehend the law's
tremendous potential. 62 Nevertheless, since the enactment of
RICO, numerous Supreme Court decisions have answered many
of the legal questions regarding who is subject to RICO and how
the law should be applied.63 In these decisions, the Court followed
the congressional mandate to construe RICO liberally, which
opened the doors to the government's heightened pursuit of
LCN.64
F Judicial Interpretation of RICO's Key Terminology
The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified key terms contained
within 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). By interpreting terms such as "conduct
or participate," 65  "pattern of racketeering activity, ' 66  and
57. JACOBS, supra note 7, at 9-10.
58. Bonney, supra note 1, at 591. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
59. Bonney, supra note 1, at 591.
60. RYAN, supra note 39, at 85.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
62. RYAN, supra note 39, at 85.
63. Id. at 88-91.
64. Blakey, supra note 45, at 37.
65. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170,177-79 (1993).
66. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 479-80 (1985); H.J., Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229,239 (1989).
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"enterprise," the Court expanded and reinforced prosecutors'
ability to use subsection (c) to pursue LCN.
67
1. Reves v. Ernst & Young: "Conduct or Participate"
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court settled a
dispute concerning the precise meaning of the "conduct or
participate" language in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 68  The Court
concluded that "conduct or participate" requires participation in
the "operation or management" of the enterprise.69 Since the
operation or management test included all individuals "associated
with" a criminal enterprise, 70 prosecutors maintained the ability to
pursue all members of LCN at every level of the criminal
organization.71  Thus, the "operation and management"
terminology encompasses every LCN member, from its leadership
to its footsoldiers. 7
2
2. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.: "Pattern of Racketeering"
In RICO prosecution, the government must establish that a
defendant conducted or participated in the affairs of an enterprise
through "a pattern of racketeering activity." 73 This pattern must
consist of at least two racketeering acts committed within ten years
of one another, one of which must have occurred within five years
of the indictment.74
Racketeering acts, or RICO predicates, are defined as
virtually any serious federal felony and most state felonies.
75
These acts include "any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing
in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed
67. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,578 (1980).
68. 507 U.S. at 177-79.
69. Reves, 507 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added). For an excellent in depth discussion and
analysis of the widespread impact of the Reves v. Ernst & Young decision, see Alexander
D. Tripp, Comment, Margins of the Mob: A Comparison of Reves v. Ernst & Young with
Criminal Association Laws in Italy and France, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 263 (1996).
70. Goodwin, supra note 30, at 296.
71. Id
72. Id.
73. RYAN, supra note 39, at 176.
74. Id. at 86.
75. Goodwin, supra note 30, at 295.
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chemical ... which is chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year."' 76
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of what constituted a
pattern in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 77 In interpreting the
meaning of the term "pattern," the Court held that the legislative
intent behind RICO indicated a desire to combat organized crime
as a whole, rather than as isolated acts.78 To meet the RICO
pattern requirement, prosecutors must prove that alleged criminal
acts have both "continuity" and "relationship. ' 79
To establish continuity and relationship, the Supreme Court
in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., decided that the
criminal acts must be related to each other and "amount to or pose
a threat of continued criminal activity. '80 RICO prosecutions
subsequent to the Northwestern Bell decision treated proof of the
existence of LCN as a useful component in establishing a
connection between any two predicate acts. 8
1
3. United States v. Turkette: "Enterprise"
In United States v. Turkette, the U.S. Supreme Court enabled
prosecutors to target individuals participating in organized crime
by confirming that RICO includes criminal, or illegitimate,
enterprises within its scope.82
Turkette and twelve other defendants were charged with
operating a criminal organization involved in drug trafficking and
arson.83 Because Turkette was the first RICO case that involved a
wholly illegal enterprise, the defendants claimed that their criminal
organization was outside of RICO's scope. 84  The Turkette
defendants argued that RICO was designed to protect only
legitimate enterprises from criminal infiltration and, as such,
RICO did not criminalize involvement in organizations that
commit only illegal acts.85 By basing the argument on RICO's
76. 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A) (2000).
77. See 473 U.S. 479,480 (1985).
78. Goodwin, supra note 30, at 296.
79. Id.
80. Goodwin, supra note 30, at 296-97.
81. Id at 297.
82. See 452 U.S. 576,576 (1980).
83. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 578-79.
84. Bonney, supra note 1, at 596.
85. 452 U.S. at 579-80.
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definition of "enterprise," 86 the defendants convinced the court of
appeals that they were not culpable under RICO because they had
not attempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise. 87
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's holding
and held that the term "enterprise" included within its scope both
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. 88 According to the Court:
Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it
could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by
inserting a single word, "legitimate." But it did nothing to
indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals
was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was
exclusively criminal.8
9
The Court noted that to exclude illegitimate organizations
from RICO's scope would frustrate the statute's intended
objective to be used as a powerful weapon against organized
crime.90  Consequently, the Turkette decision expanded the
government's ability to prosecute individuals who participated in
criminal syndicates such as LCN.91
G. Impact of RICO's Judicial Interpretations
Such broad Supreme Court rulings essentially marked the
beginning of the end for LCN in the United States. 92 Judicial
interpretation defined and clarified RICO's language and aided
the government's prosecution of organized crime.
Ironically, use of the RICO statute has led to an
unprecedented assault against LCN despite the fact that RICO
never mentions terms such as "organized crime," "La. Cosa
86. RICO defines "enterprise" as including "any individual partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1974).
87. RYAN, supra note 39, at 87.
88. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81.
89. Id. at 581.
90. Bonney, supra note 1, at 597.
91. ORGANIZED CRIME 25 (James D. Torr et. al. eds., 1999). For examples of
successful -criminal RICO prosecutions against Italian organized crime groups, see United
States v. Brooklier, 85 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1206 (1983); United
States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989).
92. Bonney, supra note 1, at 597.
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Nostra," or "Mafia." 93 Italian laws that specifically target Mafia
membership have yet to achieve similar results.
III. THE ITALIAN MAFIA AND LAWS DIRECTED AGAINST
ORGANIZED CRIME
A. Italian Mafia Background
Organized crime in Italy is comprised of different criminal
entities based in the southern part of the country. Among these
groups are the Mafia in Sicily, the Camorra in Naples, the
'Ndrangheta in Calabria, 94 and, the Sacra Corona Unita, in
Puglia.95 Due to the location of these Mafia families, crime in
Italy-especially murder-is heavily concentrated in the four
southern regions of Sicilia, Campania, Calabria, and Puglia.96
Although its particular origins are not clear, the Italian Mafia
appears to have emerged and developed in response to foreign
domination of the country. 97 Historically, the Mafia provided
refuge and protection to Italian peasants who lived under harsh
foreign rule.98 The Italian Mafia was originally considered to be a
"patriotic, albeit clandestine, society" whose members used
guerilla warfare against foreign intruders." 99 Over time, however,
the Italian Mafia became increasingly involved in criminal
activities, particularly extortion and murder. The Italian Mafia's
power and its involvement in illegal activities is extensive:
Their illegality bordered on anarchy except that the Mafia
substituted their version of law and social control for that of the
duly constituted government. Even today, it is generally
93. Christopher D. McDemus, Reves v. Ernst & Young: The Supreme Court's Recent
Restrictive Standard Concerning § 1962(c) of the Civil RICO Statutes, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1027, 1036-37 (1994). The lack of focus on organized crime in the RICO statute was due
to "legislative compromise." Id.
94. For brief definitions of the three respective crime groups, see RYAN, supra note
39, at 274-75. Distinguishing between the names of these "families" is not particularly
important, as use of the popular term "Mafia" has become all-encompassing. Id. at 36.
95. See ANTONIO NICASO & LEE LAMOTHE, GLOBAL MAFIA 68-70 (1995).
96. Riccardo Marselli & Marco Vannini, Estimating a Crime Equation in the Presence
of Organized Crime: Evidence from Italy, 17 INT'L REV. OF LAW & ECON. 93 (1997).
Marselli and Vannini provide a comprehensive analysis of statistics for murder and other
various crimes in Italy.
97. RYAN, supra note 39, at 33-34.
98. Id. at 34. Italy was controlled by the Arabs in the ninth century, the French in the
eleventh century, and the Spanish in the fifteenth century. Id. at 33-34.
99. Id. at 34.
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acknowledged that the citizens of Sicily pay taxes (and show
loyalty both to the duly constituted government and to theMafia. 100
The widespread societal influence of the present-day Italian
Mafia can be traced back to nineteenth-century feudal Italy, where
Mafiosi took advantage of the unsteady relationships between the
central government, landlords, and peasants. 10 1 By using the
conflicts between these three groups to their benefit, Mafia leaders
solidified and expanded their organization. 10 2 Because of the
ineffective nature of governmental law enforcement, the Italian
Mafia became the principal vehicle for both law enforcement and
law violation.10
3
B. Mafia Influence Over the Italian Legal and Political Systems
The extent of the Mafia's influence over Italian legal and
political entities presents a substantial obstacle to controlling
organized crime. Numerous government and public officials have
been suspected or accused of collusion with the Mafia. 10 4 For
example, in a highly-publicized four-year trial, the Italian
government accused the ex-Prime Minister of Italy, Giulio
Andreotti, of expanding the Mafia's criminal capabilities within
the country. 10 5  Among other things, prosecutors charged
Andreotti with accepting, as Mafia favors, the murders of two men
who allegedly possessed damaging information about him.10 6
According to the chief prosecutor at the trial, Andreotti's actions
100. Id.
101. Id. at 35.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., SEINDAL, supra note 14, at 146-47 (discussing instances of collaboration
between the Italian authorities and the Mafia).
105. Richard Boudreaux, Ex-Premier of Italy Acquitted of Mafia Charges, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1999, at A20. Initially, Mr. Andreotti was acquitted of all charges. Id However,
on November 17, 2002, an appeals court in Perugia found Andreotti guilty of ordering the
1979 murder of Mino Pecorelli, and sentenced him to twenty-four years in prison. It was
alleged that Mr. Andreotti had the controversial magazine editor killed to prevent the
publication of a potentially damaging document. Mr. Andreotti remains free until the
Supreme Court reaches a final verdict. Philip Willan, Andreotti fights back on Mafia
allegations, The Age, Nov. 30, 2002, at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/11/29/
1038386308331.htmi.
106. PATRICK MCCARTHY, CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE 151-52 (1997).
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allowed the Mafia to become "the only organization in the world
that could exercise its power over a legal state. '10 7
Moreover, Italian judges and magistrates have also
succumbed to Mafia corruption.10 8  Members of the Italian
judiciary have been known to accept bribes in exchange for issuing
building permits or arranging "adjustments" of trials.10 9
Magistrates have been charged with notifying Mafiosi of
impending investigations and otherwise hindering such
procedures. 1
10
In addition to using methods such as bribery, the Mafia has
effectively controlled Italian officials through violence and
intimidation. Police officers who cross paths with Mafiosi often
"look the other way," knowing that any officer who confronts a
Mafia member can be killed.111 By assassinating Italian officials,
the Mafia might discourage governmental action deemed
threatening. 112
According to investigators, Mafia leaders further protect
themselves against law enforcement by limiting each member's
knowledge about the organization, and establishing new ties with
other Italian organized crime gangs. 113 Further, when the
government makes advances against Mafia interests, Italian crime
families are able to quickly recover. "As soon as voids are created,
they are filled .... [W]hen one or two people are captured, the
organization continues to work. The people who take their places
have already been preordained as successors. '1 14  Due to the
enormous power the Mafia has over the Italian political and legal
systems, the government continually faces a difficult challenge to
develop and enforce laws that can effectively fight organized
crime.
C. Pre-1982 Italian Laws Against Organized Crime
Although the Italian Mafia in its present form has been active
for over a century, the first significant legislative efforts against it
107. Boudreaux, supra note 105, at A20.
108. MCCARTHY, supra note 106, at 77; SEINDAL, supra note 14, at 146-47.
109. SEINDAL, supra note 14, at 146; MCCARTHY, supra note 106, at 77.
110. MCCARTHY, supra note 106, at 77-78.
111. Id. at 151.
112. SEINDAL, supra note 14, at 146.
113. Cowell, supra note 9, at 10.
114. Id (quoting Roberto Scarpinato, a high-level prosecutor in Palermo).
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did not occur until the 1950s.115 In addition, before 1965, no laws
explicitly named the "Mafia." This failure to specifically identify
the Mafia probably stemmed from the widespread reluctance to
acknowledge the Mafia's existence as a problem." 6 Before 1982,
Italy's laws against the Mafia focused on crime prevention,
specifically regarding individual criminal acts.
1. Act Number 1435 of 27 December 1956
One of the first Italian laws to affect the Mafia was Act
Number 1435 (Act 1435), which implemented "preventative
measures designed to protect public security and morals." 117
Under Act 1435, law enforcement officers would first provide
warnings to individuals who were perceived to threaten public
security or morals. If individuals failed to comply with the initial
warning, officers could place them under surveillance, subject
them to house arrest, or send them into internal exile in a different
municipality." 8  Act 1435 provided only for administrative
measures implemented by law enforcement and, as such, did not
require the accused to appear before a court.119 Ultimately, Act
1435 proved to be counterproductive, however, since it
contributed to Mafia expansion outside of Sicily. Mafia members
sent into internal exile had the opportunity to connect with like-
minded criminals in other areas of Italy.120
2. Act Number 575 of 31 March 1965
After seven police officers died in a car bomb ambush, the
Italian government responded by passing Act Number 575 (Act
575).121 Act 575 essentially modified the administrative measures
in Act 1435 and extended its scope to include persons "associated
with" the Mafia. 122 In addition to the penalties of surveillance,
house arrest, and internal exile contained in Act 1435, the new law
included a provision allowing law enforcement to confiscate
115. SEINDAL, supra note 14, at 18.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 19.
118. Id
119. Id.
120. Id
121. Id at 15-16, 19.
122. Id at 19.
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passports, driver's licenses and gun licenses. 123 Act 575 was
limited, however, in a manner similar to U.S. pre-RICO legislation
because it only criminalized the "mafioso as an individual, but ...
not.., the Mafia as an organization.'
124
3. Article 416 of the Italian Penal Code
Prior to the enactment of Acts 1435 and 575, other laws, such
as Article 416 of the Rocco Code of 1931, attempted to address
organized crime. 125 Article 416 enables the Italian government to
prosecute individuals who form an independent organization to
engage in criminal activity. 126 By so doing, the law provides the
government with a platform from which to launch an assault
against organized crime.
Article 416 focuses on the creation of the criminal
organization.1 27  Under Article 416, if at least three persons
associate for the purpose of committing crimes, they can be
punished by imprisonment for a term of three to seven years.
128
The group's structure needs only to be adequate enough to
commit its intended crimes.129 For example, to be culpable as
members of a criminal association under Article 416, the members
must "join the organization voluntarily.., agree to pursue the
shared criminal goals of the group... [and] intend to engage in a
continuous course ofcriminal conduct," as opposed to isolated acts
or a fixed number of crimes.
130
D. Post-1982 Italian Laws Against Organized Crime
The relationship between the Mafia and the Italian State has
been analogized to an accordion: the State attacked the Mafia only
123. Id.
124. Id at 20. By criminalizing Mafia association, the government actually
compounded the problem. See discussion infra Part E.
125. ENCICLOPEDIA GARZANTI DEL DIRITTO 1062 (2d ed. 1997). The Rocco Code
derives its name from the surname of two brothers, both jurists, who coauthored the code.
Id.
126. Tripp, supra note 69, at 301 (citing 7 MANZINI, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO PENALE
ITALIANO 192 (Gian Domenico Pisapia ed., 5th ed. 1983)).
127. Id. (citing 7 MANZINI, TRATrATO DI DIRITO PENALE ITALIANO 197 (Gian
Domenico Pisapia ed., 5th ed. 1983)).
128. C.P. art. 416 (Italy).
129. See Tripp, supra note 69, at 301 (citing 7 MANZINI, TRATrATO DI DIRITO
PENALE ITALIANO 197 (Gian Domenico Pisapia ed., 5th ed. 1983)).
130. See id. (citing 7 MANZINI, TRATrATO DI DIRITTO PENALE ITALIANO 195 (Gian
Domenico Pisapia ed., 5th ed. 1983))
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when there were particularly grave homicides, and the Mafia only
attacked State representatives when they showed too much zeal in
their repressive actions. 131  This quasi-peaceful coexistence
reached an impasse in 1982, when the Mafia assassinated Prefect
Carlo Alberto Della Chiesa.132 Ten days after his assassination,
the legislature responded with the La Torre-Rignoni Act,133 which
criminalizes Mafia-type associations. 134 The La Torre-Rignoni
Act's passage marked a legislative turning point against the Italian
Mafia. 135
Prompted by the murder of Della Chiesa, the Italian
legislature determined a more refined law was necessary to combat
the Mafia. With the passage of the La Torre-Rognoni Act,
formally codified as Article 416-bis,136 not only would the
government punish Mafia association and collaboration, but also
Mafia membership itself.137 The legislative intent behind Article
416-bis was to prosecute the intoccabili, those individuals who
belong to the criminal organization but "against whom law
enforcement agencies... [lack] concrete evidence of particular
criminal acts."'138 Article 416-bis allows prosecutors to go beyond
prosecuting individual Mafiosi in order to confront the Mafia's
entire dynamic structure. Within the four years following the law's
enactment, approximately 15,000 individuals were reported for
Mafia association.
139
131. ENCICLOPEDIA GARZANTI DEL DIRITTO, supra note 125, at 737.
132. See FRANCESCO RENDA, STORIA DELLA MAFIA 404-05 (Sigma Edizioni 1998)
(providing a partial list of government officials who the Mafia murdered, including a
police superintendent, a police captain, a judge, the provincial secretary of the Christian
Democratic Party of Palermo, and perhaps the most famous of all, Prefect Carlo Alberto
Della Chiesa); see also ALISON JAMIESON, THE ANTIMAFIA: ITALY'S FIGHT AGAINST
ORGANIZED CRIME 27 (2000) (presenting a complete list of the murders of state
representatives by the Mafia from 1963 to 1998).
133. Act no. 646 of 13 September 1982 was named after both the Communist author,
Pio La Torre, who the Mafia had murdered shortly before Della Chiesa, and then-Minister
of the Interior, Virginio Rognoni. SEINDAL, supra note 14, at 20.
134. ENCICLOPEDIA GARZANTI DEL DIRITrO, supra note 125, at 738.
135. Id. at 737.
136. C.P. art. 416 (Italy).
137. SEINDAL, supra note 14, at 20.
138. JACQUEMET, supra note 19, at 47.
139. JAMIESON, supra note 132, at 30. For a specific breakdown of the number of
persons arrested for the crime of Mafia association from 1988 to 1997, see id at 82.
159
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Article 416-bis functions as an extension of the general
criminal complicity law of Article 416.140 The amendment targets
any group comprised of three or more members whose mission is
similar to the Mafia, 141 and provides for a prison term of three to
six years. 142 Individuals can be culpable under Article 416-bis for
forming a criminal association and committing crimes in ways
considered characteristic of the Mafia.
With Article 416-bis' enactment, prosecutors no longer have
to establish the criminal act before establishing the Mafia
association's existence. Instead, investigators can pursue criminals
who simply have association with the Mafia.143 Prosecutorial tasks
are easier under Article 416-bis than under previous laws:
Prior to the addition of [Article 416-bis] prosecutors in Italy,
like U.S. prosecutors, had been hindered from prosecuting
Mafia leaders by, among other things, the Mafia organizational
hierarchy that insulated bosses from the subordinates that
committed street crimes. Under [Article 416-bis], a group of
three or more people that uses intimidation to commit crimes,
or gain control over businesses or public contracts may be a
Mafia association.
144
Thus, prosecutors no longer need to prove the existence of an
organized criminal structure. 145 Instead, investigators only have to
prove a connection between the Mafia's method of procuring
profits, and the types of illegal activities in which its members
engage.146  Under 416-bis, witnesses are unnecessary, and
prosecution is based upon relating the crimes committed to the
documentation of the economic and financial operations carried
out by Mafia members.
147
E. Problems With Applying Article 416-bis
Although Article 416-bis was passed with a clearly defined
purpose, its initial implementation proved problematic. Because
140. See I Nuovi QUATTRO CODICE CIVILE E DI PROCEDURE CIVILE PENALE E DI
PROCEDURE PENALE 900 (Francesco Bartolini ed., La Tribuna Piacenza 3rd ed. 1994).
141. Tripp, supra note 69, at 302.
142. C.P. art. 416-bis (Italy).
143. JAMIESON, supra note 132, at 29.
144. Tripp, supra note 69, at 302.
145. ENCICLOPEDIA GARZANTI DEL DIRIrro, supra note 125, at 739.
146. Id at 737.
147. Id.
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the law criminalizes membership in what the legislature termed a
"Mafia-type association," Italian prosecutors encountered
difficulties in collecting evidence to meet this ambiguous
definition.148 The Italian Justice Department faced emerging
problems because 416-bis failed to define the terms
"membership," "belonging," and "criminal group."'149 During the
first trial under the newly implemented Article 416-bis, the Justice
Department discovered that the boundary between members of a
criminal organization and innocent people became obscured. 150
Numerous innocents were indiscriminately included within the
prosecution's self-developed standards for determining Mafia
membership.151
After a June 1983 police roundup, over one thousand
individuals, many of whom were innocent, were indicted under the
newly enacted Article 416-bis. 152 During preliminary hearings, the
Italian Justice Department attempted to establish formal standards
that utilized concrete and credible evidence to identify and
prosecute Mafia members. 153  The prosecution's reliance on
certain written materials as its primary form of evidence tended to
be problematic. 154 These written materials included address books
of "certified" 155 Mafia members, records of people in attendance
at Mafia trials, prison receipts of money orders originating from
Mafia-controlled areas, and letters written by known Mafia
members. 1
56
The Justice Department took a broad approach to using this
evidence for determining who belonged to a Mafia association.
For example, if a list of names contained the name of at least one
convicted Mafia member, the State would identify it as a Mafia
list.157  Unfortunately, since many Italians share identical
148. See JACQUEMET, supra note 19, at 46-52.
149. See id at 47-52.
150. Id. at 46-48.
151. See id. at 46-52.
152. Id at 48.
153. Id.
154. See id at 47-52.
155. "Certified" referred to Mafia members who had already been convicted of the
crime of association. Id. at 48.
156. Id
157. Id.
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surnames, it was not uncommon for prosecutors to inadvertently
seize the wrong person.
158
These evidentiary problems were compounded by speedy
preliminary trials, which generated rushed evaluations and hasty
summaries of crimes. 159  Eventually, the Justice Department
acknowledged that innocent people were being erroneously
accused. 160 The Magistrate Court took note of this concern and
refused to prosecute nearly a third of those indicted, of which 144
were cases of mistaken identity.
161
After these problems came to light in the first prosecution
based on Article 416-bis, the Justice Department noticed that the
reliance on circumstantial evidence was far too great. The
prosecution's evidence needed to be substantiated. The Justice
Department needed to produce individuals who could validate the
evidence by clarifying the boundary between the uninvolved
community and the criminal organization. 162 For this reason,
prosecutors increased their use of expert witnesses in the form of
pentiti (collaborators from criminal organizations). 163
F. The Mafia's Powerful Influence over Italy's Legal System
The Italian Mafia is distinct from other forms of criminal
associations because it presents itself as a counterpart in
competition with, and sometimes in substitution to, the legitimate
legal system of the State.164 The Mafia derives tremendous
counter-power directly from its constant use of intimidation and
violence. 165 Additionally, the power of the Mafia is premised
upon its ability to provide advantages or privileges in a shorter
period of time than would normally be necessary through legal
158. Id. at 49.
159. Id. According to Italian law, the judiciary had only two months to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence linking the individual to the criminal organization. Id. at 52. In
the instant case, of the 1,013 people indicted, the interrogation time for each defendant
was twenty minutes (fifty-four working days of seven hours each). During this twenty-
minute period, the judge had to determine whether there was adequate evidence to try the
individual for a crime that carried a possible twelve-year prison sentence. Id.
160. Id. at 52.
161. Id
162. Id. at 53.
163. Id.
164. ENCICLOPEDIA GARZANTI DEL DIRITTO, supra note 125, at 736.
165. Id.
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channels. 166 These factors all tend to feed the illusion that the
Mafia is a legitimate alternative to the existing state government.
The Mafia is distinguished from other forms of organized
crime by its use of territorial control and its penetration into the
core of political, institutional, and administrative powers. 167 In
Sicily, Calabria, Puglia, and Campania, the Mafia has successfully
substituted itself for the State apparatus, maintaining order and
security. Consequently, if the citizenry perceives the State as
ineffective in its duties, the Mafia may fortify the people's
assessment that criminal organizations are stronger than legal
structures. 168
The Italian State's tendency to maintain a peaceful
coexistence with the Mafia has exacerbated the problem of
organized crime. Tacit agreements often exist between Mafia
leaders and heads of political parties, which may guarantee
electoral votes in exchange for benefits such as curbing obstruction
of Mafia activity or granting immunity to mob bosses who are
accused of criminal acts.169 Perhaps the most significant obstacle
to combating organized crime in Italy relates to the reactive, as
opposed to proactive, approach that Italian legislators have taken
in dealing with organized crime. The Italian legislature could
initiate a more effective anti-Mafia assault by taking a proactive
approach and creating a more comprehensive plan to eradicate
organized crime:
The antimafia struggle in Italy which began over one hundred
years ago ... has been characterized by long periods of inertia
and compromise punctuated by knee-jerk reaction and frenzied
activity. The result has been a Mafia-Antimafia seesaw,
swinging between alternate highs and lows with long periods of
equilibrium. The balance was upset when isolated individuals-
the heroes of the Antimafia, endowed with unusual intuition
and courage-dared to violate the truce of reciprocal tolerance.
But these individuals were easily identifiable and could be
eliminated, after which, following a period of reaction and
reorganization on the part of the State, the balance was re-
established. 17
0
166. Id.
167. Id at 736-37.
168. Id. at 737.
169. Id.
170. JAMIESON, supra note 132, at 39.
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Because of this dynamic, amending existing laws and enacting
additional laws will have only limited success against the Mafia.
To make real progress against the Mafia, there must be a change in
the laissez-faire attitude of the Italian people. This proposition is
properly summarized by Jamieson: "If the Antimafia ultimately
triumphs-and the question remained open in 1999-then it will
be because society as a whole wills the defeat of the Mafia, not just
the few who step out of line." 171 By exerting influence over the
police force and the judiciary, the Mafia can ensure that its
members enjoy continuing freedom. 172 Thus, the Mafia has all but
guaranteed its eternal presence in Italian society.
IV. CONCLUSION
RICO's broad terminology has required the U.S. judiciary to
continually construe its meaning to meet the legislature's stated
objective: destroying organized crime at its roots. Unfortunately,
the Italian judiciary has not been able to consistently apply 416-bis
for a number of reasons, including the continuing corruption of
politicians and officials, societal tolerance of the Mafia, and the
inability and inadequacy of the judiciary in developing stringent
standards for interpreting the language of 416-bis.
The days of Mafia dominance in Italy will be numbered when
the Italian legislature finally decides to aggressively pursue a
comprehensive campaign against the Mafia. This campaign must
include not only stringent laws aimed at the criminalization of
Mafia membership, but also investigations of political figures who
continue to demonstrate a willingness to tolerate Mafia presence.
Until such time, however, Article 416-bis, unlike its U.S.
counterpart, will continue to enjoy only limited success.
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